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Abstract
In this paper we model taxpayer participation in an unanticipated tax amnesty
w h i c hc a nb ee n t e r e db yp a y i n gaﬁxed amount. Taxpayers are characterized by
a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function and diﬀer in relative
risk aversion coeﬃcient and in income. With minor changes the same model also
describes a FATOTA (Fixed Amount of Taxes or Tax Audit) system. Our results
show that amnesties may fail as a self-selective device to fully separate large-scale
from small-scale tax evaders and to extract resources from the former. Only taxpayers
whose relative risk aversion falls within a given interval participate, while those whose
evasion is too small or too large do not enter. The model is used to estimate relative
risk aversion and tax evasion of participants in the 1991 and 1994 Italian income tax
amnesties.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: H260, D890, K420.
Key words: tax amnesty, tax evasion, relative risk aversion, self-selection.
∗(Corresponding author) Dept. of Economics and Finance, Largo Zecca 8/14, 16124 Genova (Italy).
Phone: +39-131-283745; fax: +39-131-263030; e-mail: carla.marchese@unipmn.it
†Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, Univ. of Eastern Piedmont, C.so T. Borsalino 50,
15100 Alessandria (Italy); e-mail: fabio.privileggi@unipmn.it
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Attitudes toward risk play a key role in determining citizens reactions to taxation. Risk
aversion, which is often assumed, helps explain why tax systems are viable, as it commands
the willingness to pay risk premia, even when the expected penalties are small. On the
other hand, diﬀerences in risk aversion may give rise to equity problems. Taxpayers who
diﬀer in their risk attitudes may diﬀer in their degree of tax compliance. The actual tax
burden thus varies without any equity justiﬁcation. Eﬃciency problems are also likely to
arise, such as the “excess burden” of tax evasion pointed out by Yitzachi (1987).
Taxation could, however, be designed with a view to exploiting diﬀerences in risk at-
titude. Some speciﬁc tax law provisions seem in fact to do so in promising to remove, at
a given price, the uncertainty stemming from random tax audits, thus oﬀering insurance
in order to induce the self-selection of taxpayers. The FATOTA system (see Chu [1990]),
for example, allows taxpayers to pay a Fixed Amount of Taxes (called FAT), rather than
to report income as usual and run the risk of a control. By assuming that all taxpayers
have the same preferences and are risk averse1, but diﬀer in income, Chu (1990) shows that
the ﬁxed tax will be chosen by those prone to the greatest evasion. The welfare improv-
ing characteristics of the FATOTA system resemble those of plea bargaining in criminal
proceedings2, which, at given conditions, induces the self-selection of the indicted. Unan-
ticipated tax amnesties in which participants make ﬁxed payments may be modelled in a
similar way, as they remove the threat of (further) controls.
In this paper we present a tax amnesty model, based upon the expected utility ap-
proach, in which participants must pay a ﬁxed amount. We depart from previous research
1Chu (1997) assumes in an example logarithmic utility (implying DARA, Decreasing Absolute Risk
Aversion) which belongs to the family of utility functions we study here.
2On this topic see Grossman and Katz (1983).
2conducted by Marchese and Privileggi (1997), which used a Constant Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (CARA) utility function, and here assume that all taxpayers are characterized by a
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. Heterogeneity among taxpayers
is assumed. Taxpayers thus diﬀer in relative risk aversion coeﬃcient and in income, which
are treated as continuous unobservable variables.
The main result of this paper is that amnesties may fail as a self-selective device to
fully separate large from small evaders and to extract resources from the former. If tax-
payers display CRRA preferences, very rich taxpayers with very low risk aversion might
not enter3; participants are only those whose evasion belongs to a given interval. This re-
sult accords with available empirical research, which provides case studies (see Fisher et al.
[1989]) in which only small evaders participate in amnesties. It also accords with conjecture
and examples put forth in the literature about plea bargaining (see, e.g., Grossman and
Katz [1983]). However, the modelling of possible self-selection failures of FATOTA or tax
amnesties has not been considered in previous literature (see for example Chu [1990], Fran-
zoni [2000] and Marchese and Privileggi [1997]) and does not represent a trivial extension
from the plea bargaining literature.
In Section 2 we model the reaction to an unanticipated amnesty by a partial evader who
has previously optimally reported his income. With minor changes, the same model also
describes the reaction to a FAT proposal. The non-trivial analytical diﬃculties arising with
the CRRA utility function speciﬁcation have been overcome by constructing and solving an
approximated version of the model. In Section 3, amnesty participants are characterized
with reference to their relative risk aversion and tax evasion. In Section 4, results of a
deterministic estimation on data pertaining to the 1991 and 1994 Italian tax amnesties are
3With CARA preferences this cannot happen, and all taxpayers with a percentage of concealed income
equal to or greater than a given threshold enter the amnesty (see Marchese and Privileggi [1997]).
3reported. The conclusions focus on the eﬃciency and equity implications of tax amnesties.
2 Modelling the Taxpayer’s Problem
The utility that taxpayers enjoy out of their income w is assumed to be of the standard





In the class (1) we also include the case α =1by taking u(w)=l i m α→1 (w1−α − 1)/(1 − α)=
lnw. To focus upon the tax evasion problem, it is assumed that income is exogenous and
non random, thus ignoring, on the one hand, the feed-back of taxation upon hours of work,
savings, etc., and, on the other hand, background risks the agent may face.




where y denotes the reported income and 0 < γ < 1, δ > 1 are parameters such that
γyδ <y ; i.e., the reported income must always be higher than the amount of tax to be
paid. This implies that y<γ1/(1−δ) must hold.
As we rule out rewards to honest taxpayers by assumption, a taxpayer will report
y ≤ w,w h e r ew>0 denotes the true income. For reasons of analytical tractability that
will become clear in Section 3, we assume that the sanction to be paid in case of detection
is proportional to the amount of concealed income:
b s(w,y)=σ (w − y), (3)
where σ > 0 is a penalty rate. Since we are considering a progressive tax system deﬁned
as in (2) joined with a sanction function b s(w,y) which is linear in concealed income, the
4selection of a suitable range of values for parameter σ becomes a critical issue that will be
extensively discussed in Appendix B.
To ensure that the taxpayer can always bear the loss in case of detected evasion, it is
assumed that:
σ (w − y) ≤ w − γy
δ, (4)
which implies that, for each given w,t h e r ei ss o m e 4 mw such that 0 ≤ mw ≤ y,w i t h
mw > 0 whenever y<w .
To summarize, letting






with ε > 0 arbitrarily small, then the feasible set of values for the reported income y is the
closed interval [mw,M w].
2.1 Rational Taxpayer’s Behavior
We assume that, while ﬁlling in their income tax forms, taxpayers are unaware of a coming
tax amnesty, and thus only concerned with standard income tax parameters.
A rational taxpayer who earned a true income w>0 will choose to report the amount




w − γyδ¢1−α + p
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with respect to the reported income y,w h e r e0 <p<1 is the probability of detection.
Note that, by considering u(w)=l n w when α =1 , Eu(y) is well deﬁned for all α > 0
and for all feasible y. Note also that Eu(y) is strictly concave over [mw,M w] for all α > 0,
hence, there exists a unique mw ≤ v ≤ Mw that maximizes the expected utility.
4Note that mw cannot be explicitly calculated, since (4) cannot be solved with respect to y; moreover
mw =0if and only if y = w.
5Since we are interested exclusively in the behavior of partial evaders, we shall assume
that the optimal amount of reported income v lies in the interior of the feasible set, i.e.,
mw <v<M w; we rule out full evaders and full compliers. Thus, utility maximization is
completely described by F.O.C. in (5), which leads to
w − γvδ − σ (w − v)









Note that the assumption of interiority of solution v implies the left hand of (6) to be










A necessary condition for (7) clearly is
σ > γδv
δ−1, (8)
which envisages a sanction rate larger than the marginal tax rate. It will thus be assumed
that (8) holds in the following.
The choice of joining an exponential function to determine the amount of taxes due,
t(y)=γyδ in (2), to an aﬃne function to calculate the sanction in case of detection,
s(y)=σ (w − y) in (3), does not allow for an explicit solution v of the maximization
problem. Our goal, however, is that of estimating the true income w for a given (optimally)
reported income v, and for this it is enough to have existence and uniqueness of an interior
solution for the maximization problem of rational taxpayers, characterized by (6).
2.2 Participation in an Unexpected Amnesty
Suppose that after taxpayers have reported their optimal income v, but before audits begin,
the tax administration oﬀers the taxpayers the possibility of paying some ﬁxed amount x in
order to avoid any applicable sanction with certainty. Ignoring, for the sake of simplicity,
6inter-temporal discounting, and assuming that no other relevant variables (e.g., true income,
penalty rate, etc.) have changed in the meantime, the taxpayer will accept the oﬀer if she
is at least indiﬀerent between paying the certain amount x or maintaining her status as
partial evader. Thus, in order to participate in the amnesty, the following condition must
be met:
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w − γvδ¢1−α + p
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where the additive constants −(1 − α)
−1 have already been dropped from both sides. Ob-
viously, a necessary condition for (9) to hold is that the extra payment x must be lower
than the sanction:
0 <x<σ (w − v). (10)
From the point of view of the tax administration, the reported income v is available
(observable) information, and the ﬁxed amount x is assumed to be a parameter exogenously
provided by some government decision maker5,w h i l et h et r u ei n c o m ew and the individual
constant relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient α are unobservable variables. By considering
jointly the optimal behavior of taxpayers as expressed in (6) and the threshold condition
(9), we are led to the following system:

     
     
£
w − γvδ − σ (w − v)
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w − γvδ − x








w − γvδ − σ (w − v)
¤1−αo
(11)
where the reported income v and the amnesty payment x are given and α and w are the
unknowns. All pairs (α,w) solving system (11), characterize the subset of taxpayers who
previously (optimally) reported an income v and now participate in the amnesty for the
ﬁxed amount x, in terms of their relative risk-aversion α and true earned income w.
5We do not address in this paper the symmetric problem of the government, which chooses tax and
amnesty parameters in order to maximize some objective function.
72.3 An Alternative Interpretation of the Model: Fixed Amount
of Taxes
Model (11) can also be referred to an alternative scenario, in which there are no tax
amnesties, but, rather, the government oﬀers a FAT (Fixed Amount of Taxes) as a substi-
tute for ordinary taxation. It is assumed in this case that the government holds some a
priori belief6 about a taxpayer’s optimally reported income v.T h eﬁrst equation of system
(11) then links v to the taxpayer’s true income w according to (6). The FAT oﬀer includes
the tax calculated according to government beliefs, and amounts to γvδ + x. All pairs
(α,w) solving system (11), characterize the subset of taxpayers whose (believed) reported
income is v and who accept the FAT, in terms of their relative risk-aversion α and true
earned income w, which are unknown variables. The FAT scenario is more general than
the amnesty one, as taxpayers facing a FAT oﬀer based on ap r i o r igovernment beliefs
have nothing to gain from altering their actual tax report, which is requested only if they
refuse the FAT. Note that the FAT can be oﬀered immediately as an alternative to ordinary
taxation, while the amnesty must be unexpected to work according to the system (11).
In practice, implementation of the FAT approach may be somehow diﬃcult for the
government, as ap r i o r iinformation about taxpayers’ (believed) reported income v may be
poor. To overcome this diﬃculty, FAT oﬀers are often designed for income classes rather
6In the standard approach, the taxpayer’s true income is the realization w of a random variable b w,k n o w n
only by himself and not by the government, while value v(w) of reported income is the outcome of the
taxpayer’s optimal strategy. The probability distribution of r.v. b w conditional to some other information β
(such as profession, branch of activity, properties owned, etc.) is common knowledge among taxpayers and
the government itself, which, by solving the same optimization problem of the taxpayers, may calculate the
induced conditional probability distribution of r.v. b v|β = v(b w)|β as well. Hence, in this scenario, the value
for v used in model (11) could be some proxy of r.v. b v|β, such as, for instance, the conditional expected
value E[b v|β].
8than for pointwise income values. Tax amnesties, instead, may hinge upon actual tax
reports to provide the government with the information needed to determine personalized
entrance payments, as the examples quoted in Section 4 show. Each scenario thus has
advantages and disadvantages7.
3 Approximating Solutions for the Model
W h i l ew eh a v en o tb e e na b l et oﬁnd explicit solutions of (11), in what follows we shall
study a slight simpliﬁcation of (11)t h a tp r o v i d e sas u ﬃciently clear portrait of the solution
set. Thanks to the choice made in Section 2 of a sanction function that is linear in the true
income w, we can transform the left hand side of the ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni n( 11) as follows:
£
w − γvδ − σ (w − v)
¤¡
w − γvδ¢−1 =1− σ (w − v)
¡
w − γvδ¢−1
=1− σ(w − γvδ + γvδ − v)
¡
w − γvδ¢−1





















7The Italian government is still, in fact, oscillating between these approaches. Since 1999, a reference
reported income (and implicitly a kind of FAT tax) was introduced for small business and self-employment
income. The amount of the reference incomes v are determined on the basis of physical and economic
indicators, according to the so called Studi di Settore (economic branch studies). The method for cal-
culating reference incomes has been agreed upon by the tax administration and the small business and
self-employment representative organizations.
On the other hand a new tax amnesty, based upon the disclosure of resort to moonlighters by ﬁrms and
professionals, is presently (summer 2001) under parliamentary examination.
9F o rag i v e nr e p o r t e di n c o m ev, F.O.C. expressed in the ﬁrst equation of (11), describing
the maximizing behavior of taxpayers, provides through (12) a representation for the true









Therefore, we shall henceforth focus exclusively on the variable α to study solutions of (11).
Dividing the second inequality in (11)b y
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and by substituting the left hand side as in (12) and the right hand side as in the ﬁrst















where A and B are constants deﬁned by
A =1−
(σ − 1)x




σ (v − γvδ)
. (16)
Since, by (13) and (7), 0 <r<1, the right hand side is well deﬁned. In order for
the left hand side to make sense as well, we need A − Br1/α > 0 for all α > 0,w h i c hi s
equivalent to A − B>0. A direct application of (15) and (16) to this inequality, leads to
the following assumption that will hold throughout the entire paper.
A. 1 0 <x<v− γvδ.
Assumption A.1 also ensures full liability of detected evaders when tax evasion is small,
i.e., v is very close to w. Note that, by (15), (16) and A.1,b o t h0 <B<A<1 and
0 <A− B<A− Br < 1 also hold.









− (1 − p). (17)
Note that f(α) is well deﬁned for all α > 0 and is C∞.M o r e o v e r , f(1) = 0.W i t h t h i s




f(α) ≥ 0 if 0 < α ≤ 1
f(α) ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1.
(18)
3.1 The Approximated Model
Function f deﬁn e di n( 17) does not permit a direct mathematical approach to characterizing
solutions of (18). Hence, we shall characterize solutions of a slightly simpliﬁed system and
under some further conditions. Speciﬁcally, we shall use a suitable lower bound l<ffor
0 < α < 1, while for α ≥ 1 we will be able to characterize solutions only for a subclass of











Clearly f = φ + ϕ − (1 − p).N o wd e ﬁne






ψ(α)+ϕ(α) − (1 − p) for 0 < α < 1
f(α) for α ≥ 1.




l(α) ≥ 0 if 0 < α ≤ 1
l(α) ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1.
(19)
11Lemma 1 Under A.1, ψ(α) < φ(α) for all 0 < α < 1.







for all 0 < α < 1.S i n c e(A − Br)
1−α is strictly convex for all α > 0,b yt h es u p e r d i ﬀeren-
tiability property the following is true:
ψ(α)=1− ln(A − Br)(α − 1) < (A − Br)
1−α
for all 0 < α < 1, which, coupled with (20), proves the assertion.
The proof of the lemma above explains our construction of function l. Since function
φ is neither convex nor concave over (0,1), we replace it with the convex lower bound
(A − Br)
1−α, then we further lower it by taking its ﬁrst order approximation centered
on α =1 .T h u s , l turns out to be a lower bound for f on the interval (0,1),w i t ha n
improved (linearized) shape for component φ in f; while, by construction, l = f for all
α ≥ 1. Therefore, solutions to (19) are a subset of solutions to (18); in particular, some
points in the “left-side” solution set of (18), a subset of interval (0,1), are lost through our
approximation. Note that, by construction, l0(1) = f0(1) = −ln(A − Br)+plnr.
3.2 The Main Result
The following result completely describes the solution set of our simpliﬁed model, system
(19). First we further restrict the admissible range of the parameters and the reported
income.






















Both (i)a n d( ii) are technical restrictions. The proof of Proposition 1 is based on
condition (i), which has been chosen because r ≤ e−2 is met by all available data considered
in Section 4. The idea behind the proof of Proposition 1, however, can be applied through
a symmetrical argument to obtain analogous results for the case r>e −2, as will become
clear in the sequel. The left inequality in (ii) is necessary to let both conditions (21)a n d
(23) in the next Proposition 1 to be well deﬁned. Note that, thanks to the same inequality,
condition (22) is also well deﬁned whenever (i)i ss a t i s ﬁed, as σ > 1−r implies σ > 1−e−2
provided that (i) is true. The right inequality in (ii)i sas u ﬃcient condition for full liability







' 1.618, Assumption A.2 narrows the admissible values for the penalty
rate σ to a subset of the interval (0.865,1.618].
Proposition 1 Suppose A.1 and A.2 hold. Then the solution set S ⊆ R++ of system (19)
has the following properties.
i) If condition (i) of A.2 holds with equality, then S is a nonempty interval9: S =[ α,α],
8It should be remarked, however, that the right inequality in (ii)i so n l yas u ﬃcient condition for (4).
Actually it could be relaxed a little, since from both (4) and (14) the necessary and suﬃcient condition




and so, as r<1, less restrictive than the right
inequality in (ii). Nonetheless, since the last condition does depend on α, such an assumption would
exogenously impose some lower bound on α itself, thus further complicating the subsequent analysis.
In general, progressive taxation is problematic to model as, on the one hand, the sanction must be high
enough to sustain increasing marginal tax rates, while, on the other, it should not be prohibitive, as full
liability is assumed.
9To be precise S =( 0 ,α] whenever α =0 ,s i n c eEu(·) is not deﬁned for α =0 .





σ − (1 − r)
(1 − r
p). (21)
ii) If condition (i) of A.2 holds with strict inequality, a suﬃcient condition for S to be





























then S is empty.
The proof of Proposition 1 will be accomplished through several steps. First we need a
preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2 Under A.1, function φ(α)=
¡
A − Br1/α¢1−α




is strictly concave for 0 < α ≤− (1/2)lnr and is strictly
convex for α ≥−(1/2)lnr.
Proof. A tedious direct computation of the second derivatives of both φ and ϕ gives
the result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i). This is a very peculiar (and fortunate) circum-
stance, as, in most cases, available data meet condition (i) of A.2 with strict inequality.
We consider this case in detail mainly for expository reasons, because it helps in clarifying
t h em a i ni d e ab e h i n dt h ew h o l ep r o o f .
Since equality in condition (i) of A.2 is equivalent to −(1/2)lnr =1 ,b yL e m m a2
function l(α)=ψ(α)+ϕ(α) − (1 − p) turns out to be strictly concave over (0,1) and
strictly convex over [1,+∞).T h i si s t r u es i n c e l is the sum of a constant, and functions
14ψ and ϕ, which are linear and strictly concave respectively over (0,1),a n db o t hs t r i c t l y
convex over [1,+∞).I no t h e rw o r d s ,l has a unique ﬂex-point at α =1 .M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
l(1) = 0, S is non-empty and has the form S =[ α,α] if and only if its derivative is strictly
negative at α =1 ,t h a ti s ,
l
0(1) = −ln(A − Br)+plnr<0
which, after some algebra, is the same as condition (21), which makes sense thanks to (ii)
of A.2. Note also that α < +∞ since l(α) → +∞ as α → +∞.





To simplify notation, let c = −(1/2)lnr>1. In this case we extend the argument above
by constructing a function h(α) that is as similar to l as possible but is better shaped











l(α) for 0 < α ≤ 1 and α ≥ c
χ(α)+ϕ(α) − (1 − p) for 1 < α <c .
As in the construction of function l, where we replaced the badly shaped function φ with
al i n e a ro n e ,ψ,o v e r(0,1), function h constitutes an improvement of function l again by
linearizing φ,w h i c h ,b yL e m m a2 ,i sc o n v e xf o ra l lα ≥ 1.A sar e s u l t ,h turns out to be
strictly concave over (1,c), being the sum of a constant, a linear and a concave function.
Function h(α) turns out to be the same as l(α) outside the interval (1,c),w h e r et h e
same argument of Part (i) applies. Speciﬁcally, h is strictly concave over (0,1) and l(α) ≥ 0
has a non-empty interval [α,1) as the solution as long as l0
−(1) = l0(1) < 0; while h is strictly
15convex over (c,+∞).I n s i d ei n t e r v a l(1,c),w eh a v es e e nt h a th(α)=χ(α)+ϕ(α)−(1−p)
is strictly concave. Moreover, since h is obtained by replacing the strictly convex function
φ with the segment joining two points of its graph, h(α) >l (α) holds true for all α ∈ (1,c),
while h(1) = l(1) and h(c)=l(c).N o t e t h a th is not diﬀerentiable at points α =1and
α = c, where it is only left and right-diﬀerentiable, while l0(1) exists.
Hence, h0
+(1) ≤ 0= ⇒ h(α) < 0= ⇒ l(α) < 0 for all α ∈ (1,c].F u r t h e r m o r e ,l(c) < 0
plus its convexity over (c,+∞) implies l(α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [c,α],w h e r ec<α < +∞.T o
conclude, h0
+(1) ≤ 0= ⇒ l(α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ (1,α], while, on the other side, h0
+(1) ≤ 0= ⇒
l0
+(1) = l0(1) < 0, thus also establishing the non-emptiness of the interval [α,1).Ad i r e c t
computation shows that condition h0
+(1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to condition (22), and the proof
is complete. Note that again, under our construction, we obtain a function h with a unique
ﬂex point α = c.
Part (iii).B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,ψ0(α)=φ0(1) = −ln(A − Br) over (0,1].B yL e m m a2 ,
φ
0(α) ≥ φ
0(1) = −ln(A − Br) ∀α ≥ 1 and
ϕ





















= −ln(A − Br)+
4e−2p
rlnr
and l0 (α) > 0 if −ln(A − Br)+( 4 e−2p)(rlnr)
−1 > 0, which is equivalent to (23); hence,
(23) =⇒ l0(α) > 0 for all α > 0.S i n c el(1) = 0, l0 > 0 means that l “crosses” level zero
increasingly at α =1 , and system (19) has empty solution set, as was to be shown.
Clearly Proposition 1 is only theoretically meaningful: it provides the intrinsic shape of
the solution set of a model that approximates (18). It basically states that all participants
i nt h ea m n e s t y ,i fa n y ,h a v ear e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient belonging to some interval
which includes 1.F r o mad i ﬀerent perspective, it states that taxpayers with a relative risk
16aversion coeﬃcient below some lower bound α < 1 (that is, those who, by (14), concealed
a large amount w − v) and taxpayers with a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient above some
upper bound α > 1 (that is, those who, again by (14), concealed only a small income
amount) do not enter the amnesty. In order to ﬁnd values of both extrema α and α,o n e
must rely on numerics, as the following sections show.
3.3 Robustness of our Result: an Example
The proof showed how condition (i) of A.2 forces the unique ﬂex-point of function ϕ to lie
to the right of α =1 . Clearly, it is possible to reproduce a similar technique for the case
r>e −2. Since, in view of most of the possible applications of the model, condition (i)o f
A . 2i sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed, we did not pursue this analysis.
One shortcoming of our proof is that it does not work for “small intervals”: when α
approaches 1 from the right, the suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition (22) fails, since
h0(1) ≤ 0 does not hold anymore. On the other hand, condition (23) is also only suﬃcient,
and not necessary, to have an empty set as the solution. We illustrate these facts in the
following example, where it will be shown that for values of the ﬁxed amount x between
the two thresholds (22) and (23) a solution may or may not exist, and, if there is any, it
could be an interval not containing 1. This reinforces the argument that our conditions
in Proposition 1,e v e ni ft h e ya r eo n l ys u ﬃcient conditions, are calibrated well enough to
capture most situations.
Also, in view of Section 4 which follows, let us study an example with the following values
of parameters: γ =0 .002, δ = σ =1 .28, p =0 .01 and v =2 0 ,000,000. Assumption A.2 is







' 1.618. In particular, condition (i) of A.2 holds with strict inequality
and thus parts (ii)a n d( iii)o fP r o p o s i t i o n1 will be relevant. Any ﬁxed payment x such
17that 0 <x<v−γvδ ' 15,570,564 satisﬁes A.1 and will be a good candidate for checking
conditions (22) and (23) of Proposition 1.
The upper bound for x in condition (22) turns out to be x ' 1,558,294, therefore any
ﬁxed payment that satisﬁes x ≤ 1,558,294 produces a nonempty interval [α,α] of relative
risk aversion coeﬃcients characterizing participants in the amnesty. For example, with
x =8 0 0 ,000,t h ei n t e r v a lh a sα ' 0.2 and α ' 4.85 as its extremes, as shown in ﬁgure
1 (a), where the function h discussed in part (ii)o ft h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 is plotted.
These two values, through (14), correspond to a minimum true income w ' 29,900,965
(corresponding to α ' 4.85) and a maximum true income w ' 75,609,144 (corresponding
to α ' 0.2), which imply an evasion (in terms of share of concealed income) of around 33%
and around 74% respectively.
The lower bound for x expressed by condition (23) is x ' 2,820,247, hence any ﬁxed
payment that satisﬁes x>2,820,247 produces an empty set of participants in the amnesty.
This means that function l is strictly increasing and crosses the x axis at the unique point
α =1 ,a si ss h o w ni nﬁgure 1 (b) for x =3 ,000,000.
For any value between x ' 1,558,294 and x ' 2,820,247 Proposition 1 cannot be
applied and, in principle, nothing can be said. The suﬃcient condition (22), fails to detect
the existence of a nonempty interval of values of relative risk aversion coeﬃcients, even if
such an interval exists for some values of parameter x ∈ [x,x]. On the other hand, also
suﬃcient condition (23) fails to establish the emptiness of the solution set for other values
of the parameter x ∈ [x,x].
To illustrate the ﬁrst case, take, for example, x =1 ,900,000.E v e ni f( 2 2 )i sn o t s a t -
isﬁed, ﬁgure 2 (a) shows that all taxpayers with risk aversion coeﬃcients in the interval
[0.87,1.75] will enter the amnesty10. The plot clearly shows why (22) fails: the approxima-
10The two extrema of the interval [0.87,1.75], through (14), correspond in this case to a minimum
18tion of function l (dot line) through function h (solid line) used in part (ii) of the proof of
Proposition 1, which diﬀers from l only in the interval (1,−(1/2)lnr) ' (1,1.669),t u r n s
out to be too rough as the interval [α,α] shrinks. In particular, for x =1 ,900,000,t h e
right derivative h0
+(1) turns out to be positive while l0(1) is negative.
A similar situation is shown in ﬁgure 2 (b), where only function l is plotted for x =
2,115,000. This is a peculiar circumstance since, even if l0(1) itself turns out to be positive,
an o n e m p t yi n t e r v a lo fr i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcients characterizing taxpayers who enter the
amnesty exists: the interval11 [1.11,1.26]. Note that, unlike the solution sets characterized
by condition (22), this interval does not contain the value α =1 .
Figure 2 (c) shows a situation where condition (23) is not satisﬁed but the solution set
is empty for x =2 ,125,000. Here function l crosses the x axis increasingly at α =1 , but
l0(α) is negative for some α > 1.
The last three counterexamples considered support the robustness of our Proposition
1 by showing that outside the conditions used in the proposition anything goes, that is,
conditions (22) and (23), while being only suﬃcient, seem to be “nearly necessary”. More-
over, these counterexamples show that Proposition 1 proves to be useless only in special
cases where the possible interval of participants is extremely tiny, a circumstance that does
not seem very appealing while planning a tax amnesty program. It is not coincidental that
all estimates reported in the next section fall comfortably within the range provided by
condition (22).
A last remark regards the error on the lower bound α introduced by considering the
true income w ' 50,945,526 (corresponding to α ' 1.75) and a maximum true income w ' 70,519,592
(corresponding to α ' 0.87), which imply an evasion of around 61% and around 72% respectively.
11The two extrema of the interval [1.11,1.26], through (14), correspond in this case to a minimum
true income w ' 61,258,459 (corresponding to α ' 1.26) and a maximum true income w ' 64,929,017
(corresponding to α ' 1.11), which imply an evasion of around 67% and around 69% respectively.
19approximated model (19) in place of (18). Again numerics show that such an error is small
c o m p a r e dt ot h es i z eo ft h ew h o l ei n t e r v a l[α,α], in part because it aﬀects only the side on
the left of α =1 .
4 Estimation on Data Pertaining to the 1991 and 1994
Italian Tax Amnesties
Italian Law no. 413/1991 introduced a general tax amnesty regarding basic Italian taxes12.
This amnesty was considered a success in terms of participation and revenue. Participation
was highly concentrated among taxpayers with self-employment and business income (where
it encompassed 40% of those who had ﬁled a tax report), while it was scanty among wage
earners. While this amnesty followed another major one granted ten years before, it was
nevertheless not easy for taxpayers to anticipate its timing and characteristics in order to
suitably modify their tax reports. Thus, treating the amnesty as unanticipated seemed an
acceptable starting point, to be checked ex post by comparing estimation results with those
available from other sources.
With reference to the income tax, for taxpayers not yet audited, par. 38 of the amnesty
law provides rules for calculating the extra payment necessary to enter, i.e., for calculating
variable x in our model. They are summarized in Table 1.R e q u e s t e d x payment is an
increasing function of the income tax already paid by the participant and thus of her
reported income v. This schedule seems to be dictated by the aim of extracting each
taxpayer’s willingness to pay: i.e., Italian legislators exploited the information conveyed by
income reports about potential “amnesty demand”.
Payment x was due for each year for which the amnesty was entered, from 1985 to
12More details are provided in Marchese and Privileggi (1997).
201990. To calculate the income tax amount due from each taxpayer, parameters of the tax
function (2) have been estimated with reference to the actual income brackets, for each
year for which the amnesty could be entered: details are reported in Appendix A. Amount
x due was calculated on the basis of the estimated tax due, according to the rules described
in Table 1. In view of the discussion in Appendix B, the sanction parameter σ in (3) has
been set equal to the tax parameter δ in (2). The audit rate13 in Italy in the relevant years
was around 1%;t h i si st h u st h ev a l u eu s e df o rp a r a m e t e rp.
Following the same procedure carried out in the example of Section 3.3, for every amount
x requested, we calculated upper and lower threshold levels of relative risk aversion, α and
α, and percentage evasion, e and e, needed for participation in the amnesty. Values of
parameters p,γ,σ = δ and all reported incomes v, are such that condition (i)o fA s s u m p t i o n
A.2 holds with strict inequality. Moreover, it is important to remark that all values of
parameter x turned out to be well below the bounds given by condition (22) in Proposition
1.
Here we report numeric solutions of model (19) for some representative taxpayers. Table
2r e p o r t st h er e s u l t sf o rat a x p a y e re n d o w e dw i t ha na v e r a g en e tr e p o r t e di n c o m e ,a n dw h o
enjoys average deductibles (case a); Table 3 refers to a taxpayer endowed with average
net reported business income14 (case b); Table 4 to a taxpayer endowed with average net
reported self-employment income15 (case c). All the taxpayers considered paid a tax which
belongs to the ﬁrst bracket of Table 1.
13For data about controls, see Ministero delle Finanze, Uﬃcio di Statistica, Accertamenti eﬀettuati ai
ﬁni delle imposte dirette, Roma, various issues.
14The average value is calculated without taking into account taxpayers who report income equal to zero,
and refers to entrepreneurs in the ordinary tax regime (thus excluding cases of forfeit).
15The average value is calculated without taking into account the taxpayers who report an income equal
to zero, and refers to all types of self-employment.
21The estimated relative risk aversion interval ranges from a high of around α =4 .5 to
virtually zero (as some lower threshold values are likely to be strictly positive only because
the solution of system (18) is approximated by the solution of system [19]) and is thus well
inside the range 1 − 10 usually considered16. The upper risk aversion threshold is not far
from that calculated in Marchese and Privileggi (1997), which ranged from 6.3 to 4.617.
The lower threshold percentage evasion in the examples examined always lies between
34 and 35% of the true income (to be compared with 33 and 34% calculated in Marchese
and Privileggi [1997]). The upper threshold evasion is 73/75%, thus suggesting that only
quasi-full evaders were left out of the amnesty.
To roughly assess the results, the calculated percentage evasion thresholds can be com-
pared with available evasion estimates from other sources18. For the average Italian tax-
payer during the relevant time period, the minimum evasion estimate is 19.9%,t h em a x i -
mum 36%. For self-employment and business income, the corresponding values are 42.9% -
58.1%. For income from wages or pensions, evasion is relatively quite low (8.1% - 16.1%).
Our results show, for the average taxpayer, a lower-threshold percentage evasion (needed
to make the amnesty worth entering) which is close to the top evasion values calculated
by other studies. This fact is roughly consistent with the idea that the amnesty was not
designed to be appealing for the average taxpayer. For those endowed with the average
business or self-employment income instead, the mean value of our estimated thresholds is
at most 10% higher than the mean of the evasion estimates available from other studies.
The interval we found is thus consistent with an amnesty design aimed to be appealing for
mean/high evaders in business or self-employment.
16E p s t e i na n dZ i n( 1990) quote a tradition concerning relative risk aversion, which should not be greater
than α =1 0 .
17Remember that when CARA is assumed there is no lower risk aversion threshold.
18For surveys, see Bernasconi (1995) and Monacelli (1996).
22Law 656/1994 granted a further amnesty (concordato di massa) reserved for entrepre-
neurs and the self-employed. Rules regulating this amnesty provided an entrance payment
based upon relative gross revenue and proﬁtability revealed by the tax reports19.E s t i m a -
tion results based on model (19) are shown in Table 5.
They largely conﬁrm results reached for the 1991 tax amnesty. Calculated lower thresh-
old evasion and upper threshold risk aversion parallel previous ﬁndings in Marchese and
Privileggi (1997) with a somewhat larger downward correction for risk aversion and upward
correction for evasion than for the 1991 tax amnesty.
An interesting reference point for assessing risk aversion estimates is represented by re-
sults reported in Guiso and Paiella (2001). To elicit risk attitudes they exploited household
reactions to a hypothetical lottery oﬀered to the sample of the Italian population involved
in the periodical Bank of Italy household survey of 1995. According to their estimates,
relative risk aversion range from 0.2 to 36.3, with a right-skewed distribution, a median
value of 4.8 and a mean of 5.38. Our estimates are thus coherent with an amnesty design
aimed at being selective and appealing for median-low risk averse agents.
5 Conclusions
Optimal taxation literature has pointed out (see, e.g., Brito et al. [1995]) that diﬀer-
ences in risk aversion may signal other relevant taxpayers characteristics, such as income or
productive ability. This observation has been mainly exploited to develop models of ran-
dom taxation. Suitably designed random taxes may in fact help in overcoming problems
of asymmetrical information between government and taxpayers. Moreover, diﬀerences in
19See Marchese and Privileggi (1997) for details. The amnesy was not available for those who had already
beneﬁted from the 1991 one according to par. 38. For many taxpayers, the 1994 amnesty was cheaper
than the previous one.
23risk aversion imply that the least risk averse citizens are those most willing to play lotteries.
Random taxation may increase eﬃciency by oﬀering lotteries which are cheaper to imple-
ment20 than the “tax evasion lottery”, which implies running tax controls (see Pestieau et
al. (1998).
Actual tax systems, however, do not explicitly seem to resort to the introduction of
forms of gambling, perhaps because of the traditional uncertain statute of this criterion on
moral and also religious ground. Moreover, if one assumes that taxpayers are risk averse
and that a benevolent government is at most risk neutral, randomization seems to be a
costly way of inducing taxpayer self selection, whenever it increases the overall amount of
risk with reference to the status quo ante. Taxpayer self-selection systems that resort to
insurance oﬀers, such as FATOTA or unexpected tax amnesties, seem thus a more natural
and eﬃcient way to pursue the same goals.
Some nice eﬃciency and welfare improving characteristics of the latter instruments
have been clariﬁed in the literature. Both FATOTA and tax amnesties, however, may imply
equity problems, as they introduce some kind of discrimination. Speciﬁcally, taxpayers with
t h es a m et r u ei n c o m em a yp a yd i ﬀerent total amounts according to their attitudes toward
risk. Moreover, if one introduces time discounting and taxpayer anticipation, amnesties
may increase tax evasion by prospective participants, with eﬀects upon total tax revenue
that could turn from positive into negative. In this paper we have added a further caveat
for the use of these instruments, by demonstrating that self-selection may fail when a
CRRA speciﬁcation of the taxpayer utility function is considered. Our result is in line with
ﬁndings in the literature about plea-bargaining: Grossman and Katz (1983) have noted that
self-selection of the guilty may be problematic when the indicted diﬀer in risk-aversion21.
20For instance, by oﬀering the possibility of opting for a high tax and giving to those who accept it a
ticket for a lottery that provides for a given expected rebate.
21Other related results pertain to the so called cut-oﬀ rule, according to which taxpayers who report a
24Extension of their observations to either FATOTA or amnesty models, however, is not
straightforward, as in their model committing the crime is a discrete choice (not explicitly
studied), and each defendant has an exogenously given degree of risk aversion. When taxes
are considered instead, the amount of the law breach (tax evasion), is a continuous variable,
while risk attitudes (which arguably vary depending on income) contribute to motivating
both the amount of the law breach and the willingness to accept a settlement proposal.
Self-selection of those guilty of large-scale tax evasion through FATOTA or tax amnesties
is thus quite likely to work, as happens in the examples in Chu (1990), Franzoni (2000),
and Marchese and Privileggi (1997). However, the present paper shows that the case
of an imperfect self-selection cannot be ruled out in general. With a CRRA speciﬁcation,
participation in amnesties or FATOTA programs at any rate occurs in a predictable pattern,
and leaves out evaders below and above a given risk aversion interval.
With reference to empirical results, we ﬁnd that the expected utility approach works
reasonably well to describe the behavior of participants in Italian tax amnesties, thus re-
inforcing the ﬁndings of a former paper by Marchese and Privileggi (1997). The model
studied in Marchese and Privileggi (1997) was constructed by means of an exponential
utility function (with constant absolute risk aversion), and was capable of describing only
the marginal (lower threshold tax evasion) participants; very little emerged about those
(arguably the majority of participants) who received a strictly positive beneﬁtf r o mp a r -
ticipating in the amnesty program. The new version presented in this paper provides more
information on the characteristics and the evasion extent of taxpayers entering the amnesty.
While one may argue that some quasi-full evaders did not participate, the coverage of the
Italian amnesties within the target social groups seems large, thus providing a diﬀerent
threshold income amount should not be audited. In this case, allowing for diﬀerences in risk-aversion may
undermine the working of the mechanism as well.
25picture from the case studied in Fisher et al. (1989) where the amnesty considered was
appealing mainly to small evaders. On the other hand, empirical estimates of lower evasion
thresholds based on the model presented in Section 2 are quite close to those of the pre-
vious study by Marchese and Privileggi (19 9 7 ) ,w h i c hr e l i e do nad i ﬀerent utility function
speciﬁcation, thus further enhancing the appeal of the whole approach.
Note, ﬁnally, that the model discussed in Section 3 lends itself also to a converse view
of the approach pursued in this paper, where we focussed exclusively on the problem of
unravelling the information about taxpayers characteristics conveyed by amnesty partici-
pation. Since the solution set of participants in a FAT or amnesty oﬀer is represented by
an interval [α,α] on the real line, a diﬀerent model can be constructed aimed at ﬁnding
a value for parameter x that maximizes a given social or government utility function. To
solve this problem one must ﬁgure out the number of participants in the program when
x is oﬀered, which depends on both the length α − α of the interval and the distribution
of taxpayers over the interval itself. Hence, while the problem tackled in this work was to
determine values for the unknown variable α, such a model would require the distribution
of taxpayer risk aversion α to be given. This alternative approach, which could provide
further insight into the equity and eﬃciency implications of tax amnesties, is left for future
research.
6 Appendix
AT h e T a x F u n c t i o n
The progressive income tax due, as a function of the net taxable income, can be represented
by as many linear segments as the number of income brackets; the higher the bracket, the
26higher the positive slope of the segment. O.L.S. estimation technique (with variables in
logarithms) was used to interpolate each tax schedule in order to obtain a shape like in
(2). As the income tax was often modiﬁed by the government in the period for which the
amnesties described in this paper were available, there were six tax schedules to consider,
as reported in Table 6.
B Constructing the Linear Sanction Function
In order to be consistent with the progressivity implied by the tax function (2), the sanction
to be applied in case of detection should exhibit some degree of progressivity as well. The








where g>1 is a penalty rate. Here, parameter g replaces the more widely used term 1+s;
that is, as in standard tax evasion models, the detected evader has to pay both the due tax
and the penalty s times the evaded tax.
On the other hand, we have seen in Section 3 that a crucial step in simplifying system
(11) requires a sanction function that is linear in the true income w; therefore we assumed
the form b s(w,y)=σ (w − y) as in (3). In this appendix, we provide some arguments for
determining a range for values of the coeﬃcient σ so that b s(w,y) in (3) does not greatly
diﬀer from s(w,y) in (25). To do this, let us discuss more thoroughly some restrictions
required by (25).
As we did in Section 2 through condition (4), we assume that cheating taxpayers caught






≤ w − γy
δ, (26)
27which, in turn, forces the reported income y not to be smaller than a certain amount







Moreover, the left hand in (27) is deﬁned only if gγwδ −w>0, which yields a lower bound
also for the true income w to be considered:
w>(gγ)
1/(1−δ) . (28)
Consider the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of (25) on the identity line, that is, on points
(w∗,y∗) ∈ R2 such that w∗ = y∗, which, in turn, implies s(w∗,y∗)=0 :
s(w,y)=gγδa





where a ∈ R satisﬁes (28), that is a>(gγ)
1/(1−δ). Hence, function
L(w,y)=gγδa
δ−1 (w − y)
is the linear approximation of s(w,y) around some point (a,a) ∈ R2.B yd e n o t i n g
σ = gγδa
δ−1, (29)
we get a linear approximation of the progressive sanction s(w,y) in (25) of the same form
as in (3). Now we need to ﬁnd suitable values for the critical point a, which translate in
suitable values for σ through (29). This will be achieved thanks to conditions (27) and
(28), which will provide an upper and a lower bound respectively for the critical point a.
O no n es i d ew ec a na l w a y sc a l c u l a t eal o w e rb o u n df o ra by using the inﬁmum value22
a =( gγ)
1/(1−δ) . (30)
22By using such a point as the critical value for our approximation, we actually assume the relative
sanction b s to be parametrized on the lowest income bracket. In our model, this value represents the
borderline “poorest full complier” who earns the inﬁmum (not even feasible) income w =( gγ)
1/(1−δ) and
is compelled to be honest by the model itself through condition (26). The resulting approximation b s would
be biased in favor of richer evaders who would face a relatively lower sanction in case of detection.
28On the other side, an upper bound is impossible to compute directly, since the true income
w is unknown to the authorities, and condition (27) cannot be solved in terms of maximum
true income w given some reported income y. To be more speciﬁc, condition (27) establishes
the minimum reported income y that satisﬁes solvency condition (26); by reading condition
(27) in the opposite direction, one might pessimistically assume y to be the minimum







and guess that the true income is the w in the right hand side of (31), for the given y.
The income w obtained this way is the maximum true income23 compatible with reported
income y, that satisfy (26), and could be a good candidate for an upper bound a of our
critical point a.
Unfortunately, (31) does not allow for calculation of w as a function of y.H e n c e w e
shall rely on some upper bound of such true income w, obtained by linearizing from below
the strictly convex function gγwδ − w. Since we are considering values w>(gγ)
1/(1−δ),a
useful approximation turns out to be on the point w∗ =( gγ)
1/(1−δ),w h e r egγw∗δ −w∗ =0 .




















, for all w>(gγ)
1/(1−δ) ,







23Such an upper bound for the true income w would represent some ﬁctitious “rich” taxpayer who cheated
the most by reporting y as in (31). As opposed the previous case, the resulting approximation b s would
punish the poorer income brackets by considering a relative (linear) sanction parametrized with respect to
the richest.
29for the true income which is larger than any true income w satisfying (27) for the given
reported income y.
By calculating σ for both values a as in (30) and a as in (32), we get the lower and the
upper bounds










where (increasing) dependency of the upper bound σ on the reported income y reﬂects its
“progressivity” with respect to higher reported incomes.
The lower approximation (33) looks very terse, since it does not even depend on para-
meter g.M o r e o v e r ,f o rv a l u e so fp a r a m e t e r su s e di nt h ee s t i m a t e so fS e c t i o n4 ,i ts a t i s ﬁes
both conditions (i)a n d( ii) in Assumption A.2, and numerics show that it behaves very
well for the true incomes w that were the targets of the amnesties there considered. This
justiﬁes the adoption of the sanction function b s(w,y)=δ(w − y) there. In general, how-
ever, some good theoretical compromise could be achieved by taking an average of (33) and
(34), that is, by letting σ = λσ+(1− λ)σ,w i t h0 < λ < 1. Clearly, by doing so, one must
keep an eye on the right inequality in condition (ii) of A.2, which can easily be violated.
It is interesting to remark, ﬁnally, that the choice of the minimum value σ = δ implies
the largest participation in the amnesty, as comparative static analysis shows. To see this,
consider function f deﬁn e di n( 17) and rewrite it as a function of both α and σ:
f(α,σ)=
n








− (1 − p),



















σ (v − γvδ)
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∂σ < 0 if 0 < α < 1
∂f
∂σ > 0 if α > 1,
(35)
for all feasible values of other parameters.
Now suppose that either condition (21) or (22) of Proposition 1 holds. Since, as we
have seen in Section 3, the solution set of system (11) is equivalent to the solution set of
system (18), which is, 
 
 
f(α,σ) ≥ 0 if 0 < α ≤ 1
f(α,σ) ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1,
inequalities (35) mean that the graph of f(α) is uniformly lower if 0 < α ≤ 1 and uniformly
higher if α ≥ 1 for higher values of the sanction σ, which imply a “smaller” solution set
[α,α], as can easily be understood from ﬁgure24 1 (a). In other words, this heuristic
argument shows that the eﬀects of increasing the sanction is a narrowing of the interval of
relative risk aversion which characterizes amnesty participants, which must be the largest
for the minimum sanction σ = δ, all other parameters remaining ﬁxed.
24In ﬁgure 1 (a) h(α) is actually plotted, which is an approximation of function f (α). Recall, however,
that h is a lower bound for f if 0 < α ≤ 1 and an upper bound for f if α ≥ 1; hence, inequalities (35)
imply the same eﬀects on the graph of h as on the graph of f.
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Figure 1: illustration of Proposition 1: a) plot of the function h for x =8 0 0 ,000;b )p l o t























Figure 2: failure of Proposition 1:a )p l o to ff u n c t i o n sl (dot line) and h (solid line) for
x =1 ,900,000; b) plot of the function l for x =2 ,115,000; c) plot of the function l for
x =2 ,125,000.
35DT a b l e s
Brackets of paid tax Extra payment due
0 − 10 20% of the paid tax (with a minimum of 0.1)
10 − 40 18% of the paid tax
> 40 15% of the paid tax
Table 1:p a y m e n tx in the 1991 tax amnesty (millions of Italian Lire).
Year v α e α e
1985 13.36 4.45 35% 0.21 75%
1986 14.18 4.44 34% 0.13 74%
1987 15.37 4.44 34% 0.15 74%
1988 16.74 4.44 34% 0.18 73%
1989 18.27 4.48 34% 0.08 75%
1990 19.45 4.48 34% 0.08 75%
Table 2: estimation results, 1991 tax amnesty, case (a) (v = reported income in millions of
Italian lire; α = upper threshold risk aversion; e = lower threshold percentage evasion; α
= lower threshold risk aversion; e = upper threshold percentage evasion).
36Year v α e α e
1985 12.80 4.45 35% 0.20 74%
1986 13.20 4.46 34% 0.11 74%
1987 14.00 4.45 34% 0.13 74%
1988 15.50 4.44 34% 0.16 74%
1989 17.92 4.48 34% 0.07 75%
1990 18.20 4.49 34% 0.06 75%
Table 3: estimation results, 1991 tax amnesty, case (b) (v = reported income in millions
of Italian lire; α = upper threshold risk aversion; e = lower threshold percentage evasion;
α =l o w e rt h r e s h o l dr i s ka v e r s i o n ;e = upper threshold percentage evasion).
Year v α e α e
1985 16.10 4.43 35% 0.25 74%
1986 17.60 4.43 34% 0.19 73%
1987 19.60 4.42 35% 0.22 73%
1988 23.10 4.40 35% 0.26 73%
1989 25.84 4.45 35% 0.17 74%
1990 28.05 4.45 35% 0.18 74%
Table 4: estimation results, 1991 tax amnesty, case (c) (v = reported income in millions of
Italian lire; α = upper threshold risk aversion; e = lower threshold percentage evasion; α
= lower threshold risk aversion; e = upper threshold percentage evasion).
37Year v α e α e
1987 19.32 4.26 36% 0.24 73%
1988 20.17 4.18 36% 0.26 73%
1989 22.98 4.04 37% 0.22 74%
1990 24.33 4.07 37% 0.21 74%
1991 25.31 4.08 37% 0.28 74%
1992 30.32 5.64 29% 0.10 73%
Table 5: estimation results for a taxpayer endowed with median business income from
manufacturing industry, 1994 tax amnesty (v = reported income in millions of Italian lire;
α = upper threshold risk aversion; e = lower threshold percentage evasion; α =l o w e r
threshold risk aversion; e = upper threshold percentage evasion).
Year γ δ
1985 0.002249 1.274515





Table 6: parameters of the tax function t(y)=γyδ for years 1985-1992 (OLS estimation
on logarithms of data in Italian Lire).
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